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FOREWORD 
In August 1985, the Institute of Urban Studies agreed to review 
the background to two questions raised by a controversy over a City 
of Winnipeg initiative to install a land drainage system as a local 
improvement in the •gravel road' areas of Charleswood. This contro-
versy was part of a broader set of issues concerning Charleswood•s 
pattern of development and municipal servicing. 
The notes which follow were prepared in a very short time frame 
and must be considered as preliminary in nature. Fuller treatment 
and analysis would require more extensive review of a number of matters -
e.g., a comparative review of local improvement legislation across 
Canada; a review of the history and rationale of the_local improvement 
mechanism for municipal servicing and taxation; a review of pertinent 
court cases; more detailed analysis of Charleswoodrs drainage and 
road :situation (including reports prepared for the former municipality 
and rriore conte-mporary reports done by the City of Winnipeg);_- analysis 
of the use of the cityrs deferment policy; more extensive interviewing 
of knowledgeable parties than was undertaken for this paper; and more 
detailed analysis of different proposals or options to address the 
Charleswood situation. 
Debbie Lyon 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
These notes are concerned with two elements of a current contro-
versy over plans by the City of Winnipeg to install trunk and lateral 
drainage sewers as local improvements in designated portions of 
Charleswood. 
One element -- the various equity issues associated with the 
situation -- is complicated. It also essentially is political since 
current legislation, city policy and practices all contain discretion 
as to whom is deemed to benefit from local improvements and thus should 
be responsible for the costs. 
A second set of issues involves the requirements and processes for 
an adverse petition in the event that a municipality proceeds on its 
own initiative with a local improvement. The general requirements and 
processes under the City of Winnipeg Act appear to be consistent with 
other relevant local improvement legislation in Manitoba and Ontario. 
However, this was the first time in Winnipeg that a mail-in ballot was 
used (at least since 1972). The research for this paper did not en-
compass efforts to determine whether there were technical violations of 
legislative requirements or processes which could constitute grounds for 
challenging the city in court. 
2.0 LOCAL IMPROVEMENTS PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 
- Local improvements are public improvements, the physical 
location and benefits of which are confined to a particular 
locality. Legislation may vary as to what is defined as 
a local improvement, and what a municipalityrs statutory 
powers are to undertake such works. 
-According to Rogers (1), several Canadian legislatures have 
adopted the principle that works which benefit a few residents 
are to be paid for by them, whereas those which benefit the 
municipality as a whole are to be paid for by the municipality 
out of general funds. The distribution of costs is based on 
the theory that owners of property affected by the work 
receive special benefits in excess of the benefits accruing 
to the general public. Thus, a tax is imposed by special·· 
rates on the lands being benefited, with the extent of the 
burden determined by the special advantages accruing to the 
property. However, Rogers asserts that works such as a 
network of streets and a sewerage system which benefit the 
municipality generally can scarcely be classified as local 
improvements. In particular, under the Ontario Local Improve-
ment~Act (at least in the early 1970s), works 1nvolving im-
provements over a sizeable area taking in several streets, 
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and for the general benefit of a district, apparently 
could not be considered a local improvement. (2) Again 
under the Ontario legislation, a municipal council could 
adopt the 'local improvement system' requiring that all 
works which could be undertaken as local improvements be 
so undertaken, thus preventing a council from paying for 
these out of general funds. If a council did not adopt 
this system, there was nothing to prevent it from execu-
ting a work other than as a local improvement and paying 
for it out of general revenues. (3) 
- The two common methods of initiating local improvements 
are: (a) a petition by affected owners, and (b) an initia-
tive of a municipal council which owners may oppose through 
an adverse petition. ~St9tutory provisions vary. In Ontario, 
for example, a petition under (a) has to be signed by at 
least two-thirds of the persons assessed as owners, repre-
senting at least one-half of the assessed value of lots 
(excluding buildings) to be specially taxed under the local 
improvement process. A municipal council has veto power 
over a petition (i.e., councils are not obliged to give 
effect to a petition from owners). Under (b), for an adverse 
petition to be 'sufficient[ signatures must be obtained from 
a majority of owners representing at least one-half of the 
value of the lots liable for assessment. The counter petition 
has to be submitted within one month of the first public 
notice of the council 1 s intent. If an adverse petition is 
deemed sufficient, council is forbidden from proceeding with 
the project or a similar work on the initiative plan for 
two years. (4) 
- Provisions for public notices, petitions, hearings and appeals 
may vary among legislative jurisdictions. In terms of notice 
and hearings, a general rule is that since assessment is 
considered a judicial act the parties affected must have notice 
and be allowed to be heard. It appears that if proof of 
service and publication can be supplied, the courts will con-
sider this conclusive -- although publication/service in a 
manner not authorized may have an effect on proceedings. (5) 
- Local improvements generally are assessed on an equalized basis 
against abutting properties. However, provisions generally are 
made to assess owners of non-abutting properties where it is 
deemed they derive certain advantages. Other allowances for 
inequities may be contained in the legislation, as well as 
discretion for a council to have part of the costs of a work 
borne by the municipality as a whole. 
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- Under Ontario legislation, a municipality has discretion as 
to whether to pay for renewal of a work, or to share the costs 
with owners, or to have owners pay for the entire cost -- even 
if the municipality is under the 1 local improvement system•. 
However, the duty of repair and maintenance of a completed 
work is the municipality•s. (6) 
- According to Rogers, local improvement clauses are considered 
remedial legislation and are to receive such large and liberal 
construction by the judiciary as will attain the objective of 
of a municipality•s exercise of its statutory powers under the 
legislation. The exercise of these powers is considered quasi-
judicial in character; the courts have no authority to control 
the exercise of such powers unless there has been a manifest 
excess of jurisdiction or clear evidence of bad faith. More-
over, a failure to follow procedures to the letter may not be 
cause for successful action, if it is deemed that no substan-
tial injustice has been done or there is an absence of formal-
ities which are not essential to the validity of the proceedings.(?) 
- Under the Municipal Act of Manitoba, sections of interest for 
comparative purposes with the City of Winnipeg Act include: 
.section 619 provides that where a municipality is 
authorized to undertake a work as a local improvement, 
it may also undertake and carry on as a local improve-
ment the equipping, maintenance, repair and reconstruc-
tion thereof. 
·Under Sections 621 and 622, a local improvement may 
proceed through a petition to council or by council 
on its own initiative. Key requirements for a petition 
to initiate a local improvement are that it contain the 
signatures of at least one-half of the assessed owners 
representing at least one-half of the value of all lands 
to be benefited. The requirements are the same for a 
counter petition in a case where a council proceeds on 
its own initiative. However, Section 622 (10) provides 
that where a petition is signed by at least 300 owners, 
but these do not constitute one-half of affected owners, 
a council shall hold a hearing to decide whether to 
proceed with the local improvements by-law and, if so, 
under what terms. 
·The legislation appears to provide two opportunities for 
hearings on a local improvements by-law-- at the council 
level prior to first reading and at the Municipal Board 
level after first reading. Section 622 outlines require-
ments for public notices of these hearings/stages in the 
process. 
-4-
·Section 627 provides the discretion for a municipality 
to share the costs of a work through general funds 
where it is of the view that the improvement benefits 
the municipality at large or generally, and if it 
would be inequitable to raise the whole cost by special 
local taxes. 
·As with the Ontario legislation, a council is not bound 
to act on a sufficient petition from owners who wish to 
undertake a local improvement. A council shall not 
proceed with a local improvement for two succeeding 
years in instances where petitions of objection meet the 
requirements of sufficiency. (8) 
3.0 LOCAL IMPROVEMENTS - WINNIPEG 
- It is only in recent years that storm water run-off/urban 
drainage were integrated into regional planning in Winnipeg, 
with a focus on the problems of pollution and basement 
flooding.(9) The Greater Winnipeg Sanitary District was 
formed in the 1930s to construct and operate a sewage disposal 
plant and collection system for the City of Winnipeg and 
adjacent municipalities. Under the Metropolitan Corporation 
of Greater Winnipeg, the district•s duties were taken over by 
the waterworks, waste and disposal division which also assumed 
greater powers and regional responsibilities. In terms of 
land drainage, however, Metro•s responsibilities were limited 
to dealing with storm water introduced to the sanitary sewer 
system in areas where combined sewers were used. Otherwise, 
storm water drainage was the responsibility of area municipal-
ities and, in some cases, provincial drainage districts. (10) 
In 1970, the Local Government Boundaries Commission recommended 
that surface water and main storm drains should be a respon-
sibility of the regiona~vernment. (11) The commission urged 
that the provision of main storm water interceptors continue 
to be financed through (a) developers including these costs 
in the price of land, or (b) establishing local improvement 
districts with the costs to be levied against the particular 
area of development. The commission argued that if the regional 
government assumed the costs of the interceptors, inequities 
would be created between developers as any new developments 
would face less direct costs. As well, growth might be inhibited 
since the rate and direction of development would be dependent 
on the state of the government•s finances and priorities. 
During the 1970s, urban drainage became a critical element in 
the timing and scope of development since most areas close to 
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drainage outlets already were developed. As growth extended 
further from these outlets, systems required more lead time 
for construction and were more costly. (12) The waterworks, 
waste and disposal division moved qui~kly to devel6p regional 
land drainage plans to integrate drainage into other regional 
services and the city•s planning framework. There were three 
main thrusts of this activity: the •catching up• of drainage 
facilities with other required city services for current de-
velopment; the development of regional drainage plans (includ-
ing preservation of outlets); and rationalization of drainage 
criteria (including a manual, guidelines for impoundments, a 
cost-sharing policy between developers and the city, and other 
measures). 
- The capital costs of water, sewer and similar services generally 
have been financed through user charges (user rates, development 
agreements, district and frontage levies). Plan Winnipeg con-
tinues this approach. In the case of land drainage works, 
Section 71 of the plan requires that such works be financed on 
the basis of a user-pay principle applied to benefiting proper-
ties. (13) In a pre-Plan Winnipeg study, it was suggested that 
the costs and benefits of water and waste services should be 
reviewed to ensure the methods of assigning costs were commen-
surate with the benefits obtained and adequately took into 
account the fact that all services build in a large capacity for 
future lands which are as yet undeveloped and do not contribute 
to user fees. It was argued there was merit in charging these 
lands a fee in accordance with the capacity-to-serve built into 
present-day facilities. (14) 
- The benefits issue in relation to land drainage systems was 
addressed by Metro in the 1966 version of the Greater Winnipeg 
Development Plan. Metro noted at the time that there were some 
intermunicipal studies and d~isc-ussions on land drainage but 
these were impeded by the high costs of drainage systems 
and questions about the sharing of costs. Metro noted that in 
contrast to a sanitary sewer system which is of general benefit 
to the whole community (through reduced river poHution), a 
drainage system benefits only the catchment area that it serves. 
Costs, therefore, should be carried by the area receiving the 
benefit. However, because catchment areas do not coincide with 
political boundaries, there was a need for an alternative option 
to provide a system that could not always be provided on a 
municipal basis alone. Metro suggested that the catchment areas 
should pay the larger part of the cost, but that an argument 
also could be made that there was some limited general or Metro 
benefit from controlled flows of storm water and the contribution 
of an adequate drainage system to the reputation of the Metro 
area as a place to live and work. (15) 
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- None of the contacts made during the preliminary research 
on the Charleswood issue were aware of any specific con-
sideration or undertaking re this municipality•s service 
situation upon unification in 1971-72. The provincial 
government•s paper on the proposed reorganization (1970) 
cited as one problem the wide disparity in the quality and 
level of services between municipalities in Greater Winnipeg, 
a fact frequently not revealed in the levies made for these 
services. Among other things, the proposed reorganization 
presupposed region-wide standards of services, to the extent 
feasible and desirable. The transition was to be allowed 
sufficient time to occur in an orderly fashion and enable 
the new municipal council to determine when and if it would 
take on additional responsibilities. (16) It also was 
argued by provincial government representatives that amalgama-
tion was not being pursued to save money necessarily, but to 
increase the effectiveness of area-wide planning and the 
distribution of services-- i.e., to the government, the main 
issue was the quality of services provided. (17) Associated 
with this position on services was the intent to equalize 
municipal mill rates. Charleswood was among the municipalities 
to be affected by a net increase in mill rate. 
3.1 Legislation and Policies 
- Part X of the City of Winnipeg Act contains some 50 detailed 
sections on the 1nit1at1on, cost1ng and funding of local im-
provements. (18) Relevant sections include the following: 
·The definitions of what constitute local improvements 
include the reconstruction or renewal of the specified 
works. The section (352) also is permissive in that 
costs may be levied in whole or in part against the 
land benefited. 
·The city has the discretion to determine what land will 
be benefited by a work~ what portion, if any, of the 
cost of the work will be assumed by the city at large; 
and whether non-abutting land shall be assessed any 
portion of the cost of the work. The share of costs 
borne by the city at large is not to exceed four-sevenths 
of the whole cost except as provided for in the legislation. 
A decision about the cityrs share of the cost, if any, is 
to be based on the opinion of the majority of the whole 
council as to whether a local improvement benefits the 
city at large or generally, and whether it would be in-
equitable to raise the whole of the cost by local special 
assessments. (See Sections 370 and 383.) 
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·Council has the discretion to defer or remit the payment 
of the whole or part of a special assessment in respect 
of any land benefited by the local improvement (Section 399). 
·The legislation contains specific provisions concerning 
assessments of exceptional properties (e.g., corner lots, 
land unfit for building purposes, exempt or partially 
exempt land). 
·Provision is made for additional assessment should the first 
assessment for a local improvement prove insufficient 
(Section 392). 
·Under Section 381, an appeal process is defined covering 
assessments on any land other than that fronting on the 
local improvement. The process is to occur prior to pro-
ceeding with the work or the passing of a by-law making an 
assessment.* 
-The legislation emphasizes uniform rates for local improve-
ments throughout the city (with allowances for special cases). 
However, in the case of trunk storm sewers, the rate must be 
uniform for the lands to benefit within a defined special 
assessment district but need not be uniform with other special 
assessments levied elsewhere in the city for construction of 
trunk drainage systems (see Sections 353-355). In addition, 
there is provision for assessing some lands at a greater 
rate than others within an area owing to a greater benefit 
to be derived (Sections 376 and 389). 
-Owners may petition or city council may initiate a local 
improvement. Where owners petition, they need to obtain the 
signatures of those representing at least three-fifths of the 
frontage (as defined in the act) to be benefited. The city 
is required to mail a notice of the filing of such a petition 
to owners of land to be benefited who have not signed the 
petition. This notice is to be sent prior to receipt of the 
petition by council. Upon receipt of the petition by council, 
and satisfactory evidence of notice to non-si.gners, council 
may within the succeeding two years proceed with the work 
without further notice. Where council i.nitiates a local 
* This applies to the Charleswood situation. The city had sought a 
legislative amendment to prevent delays due to thi.s proce~s. The 
amendment was too late for the last session of the legislature, however. 
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improvement, a sufficient adverse petition must contain 
the signatures of owners representing at least three-
fifths of the total frontage or area to be assessed. The 
petition must be submitted within one month of the publi-
cation of council's intent. If the petition is successful, 
the work shall not proceed as a local improvement and no 
second notice with respect to the same improvement shall 
be given by council within two years thereafter. (See 
Sections 372-377.) 
·With respect to city-owned lands, the city is regarded as 
an owner who is entitled to petition for or against the 
work but has refrained from doing so (Section 373(4)). 
According to information presented to council in 1984, 
127 of the 2,002 acres affected in Charleswood were city-
owned. (19) 
- In 1978, council approved an 11-point policy on deferment of 
local improvement assessments, spurred in part by a situation 
which arose on Kilkenny Drive. Among the policy's provisions: 
-Some nine types of local improvements are covered including 
land drainage sewers. 
·Applications for deferment should clearly indicate 
specific reasons why the owner would experience 
hardship and the property assessed would not benefit 
directly from the proposed improvement. Among the 
suggested conditions which would justify deferment are: 
"privately-owned property adversely and unfairly 
affected by housing or other development authorized by 
the City of Winnipeg" and "double frontage lots which 
have the potential for additional development but which 
is not planned or contemplated". 
·An owner is permitted at any time to pay the deferred 
levy at the original cash cost or the commuted value 
of the levy outstanding on terms no less favourable 
than those current for all other owners. 
·There are provisions for reactivation of the deferred 
levies at the same cash value or amortized cost as 
required in the original assessment by-law. This could 
occur with subdivision or resubdivision of the land, or 
rezoning, or granting of a variance changing land use. 
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It was noted in the report to council that the ability of 
owners to pay the deferred levies on the basis of the 
original assessment by-law would leave the city at large 
with responsibility for the interest lost on those levies.(20) 
- A 1979 policy concerning the construction, regrading1 re-
gravelling and maintenance of granular surface roadways 
had significant implications for Charleswood due to the 
extent of such roadways in the area. The policy and 
associated by-law were subject to unsuccessful court 
challenges by the Charleswood Homeowners Association. 
Among the provisions: 
·In terms of construction/reconstruction of granular 
roads, the city was encountering limited success in 
its general efforts to have financing supported as a 
local improvement. It was argued, however, that the 
burden of these works should not be borne solely by 
the city at large since city funding of works directly 
benefiting private property is contrary to the philos-
ophy of local improvements. Council's compromise was 
that existing unimproved rights-of-way in Winnipeg are 
to be constructed to all-weather granular surface 
standards as a local improvement. For properties zoned 
agricultural, the maximum assessable frontage for a 
single property is limited to 300 feet, with the city 
at large funding the balance of the cost. 
·In terms of maintenance and regrading/regravelling of 
existing granular roadways, council decided to end a 
policy in which the city at large was responsible for 
maintenance in perpetuity. Instead, such roadways 
constructed as a local improvement are to be maintained 
at the expense of the city at large for a maximum of 
three years following completion of construction. 
Beyond this point, the city is to do only those works 
necessary to keep the roads passable (basic grading 
only). Restoration of the roadways to the original 
local improvement construction standard must be done 
as a new improv.emelit. ( 21) 
- Time restrictions on this preliminary research did not permit 
detailed study of how 1 oca 1 impr:ovements have been handled in 
areas which might face similar circumstances as Charleswood, 
albeit on a much smaller scale. There is one example which 
readily i 11 ustrates the discretionary nature of council decision-
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making on local improvement issues, although there may be 
differences of view as to what, if any, parallels may be 
drawn with the Charleswood situation. In 1977, a municipal 
election year and a year in which extensive basement flood-
ing had been experienced during heavy rains, council approved 
a combined and separate sewer relief program, estimated to 
cost some $59 million and to be funded wholly by the city at 
large. The recommendations to the council from the executive 
policy committee were for a 12-year program at $5 million per 
year to be financed on the basis of 50 per cent city at large 
and 50 per cent levied against drainage districts. Amendments 
made during debate on the program accelerated the timing and 
annual expenditures ($10 million over six years), and placed 
the full burden on the city at large. Some 75 per cent of 
expenditures were to be directed to combined sewer districts 
(i.e., the inner city and pre-1960s suburban development). 
The older combined sewers, in particular, were incapable of 
coping with the rapid storm water run-off associated with the 
impervious nature of contemporary urban development. Basement 
flooding and discharges of untreated storm water}sewage resulted 
during wet weather. (22) 
4.0 CHARLESWOOD BACKGROUND NOTES 
- Formed out of Assiniboia as a separate municipality in 1913, 
Charleswood essentially was a rural/rural-residential area up 
to the 1960s. Prior to 1925, small developed residential areas 
were scattered throughout the municipality. Between 1925 and 
1950, development occurred between Roblin Boulevard and the 
Assiniboine River. South of Roblin, linear housing develop-
ment took place on streets such as Haney, Oakdale and Fairmont. 
Some concentrated development occurred in the Varsity View-
Lynbrook area of Charleswood East; to the west in Roblin Park 
(Pepperloaf Crescent), there was a post-Second World War 
project under the Veteran's Land Act. Development there was 
on five-acre sites with minimal federal servicing. Population 
grew slowly prior to the war (701 in 1911; 1,934 in 1941), but 
by 1951 had jumped to 3,680 and by 1961, to 6,243. In contrast 
to other suburbs in the Winnipeg area, Charleswood's development 
was more of a semi-rural nature spread over a wide area with 
houses on large lots and a significant level of agricultural 
activity (farming, market gardening, mink ranching). The . 
municipality had an extremely low population density relatiV.e 
to others in the Winnipeg area;. it a 1 so had a very fragmented 
land ownership pattern. (23) This fragmented ownership situation 
may have contributed to the leap-frog nature of the Westdale 
-11-
development which began in the mid 1960s under a development 
agreement with the municipality on raw land south of Roblin 
and just east of the Perimeter Highway. 
Charleswood installed a sanitary sewer system to service 
existing development in 1962. Ratepayers previously opposed 
a proposal for a combination sanitary and storm drainage 
system. The sewer system was put in as both a local improve-
ment and on a district or area charge basis. Owners were 
given one year to make their individual connections;. if 
they did not, the municipality gave notice that it would in-
stall the connections at the owners' expense if the owners 
did not comply within another six months. In the late 1960s, 
the municipality was engaged in a study of its storm drainage 
situation, but apparently was deterred from action due to the 
costs of a drainage system. As of 1970, all areas except 
Westdale and Paradise Drive were drained by ditches instead of 
sewers. The lack of storm drainage facilities was considered 
the only drawback to urban-type development. (24) 
- During the Metro era, much of Charleswood north of Wilkes 
and east of the Perimeter was perceived as a prospective 
urban expansion area. Planners recognized the desire of 
many existing residents to preserve the areals rural-residential 
character. At the same time, developers were beginning to 
assemble land parcels. The availability of large sections of 
undeveloped land, plus the anticipated municipal storm drainage 
service, were expected to spur urban residential development. (25) 
Consistent with Metro's policy of contiguous development, and 
with the need to stage the installation of a storm drainage 
system, the planners urged that comprehensive residential 
development be encouraged beginning in specified northern areas 
of Charleswood East and moving progressively south and west. 
Infill development was to be encouraged as well as new subdivisions. 
Three types of development appear to have occurred in 
Charleswood since the 1960s: infill development in the 
gravel-road areas served by water and sewer; some small, 
infill-like subdivisions which may or may not be fully 
serviced; and full-service subdivisions under development 
agreements. At least one developer, Qualico, extended the 
drainage system from Eldridge and Laxdal to Beiko to service 
the southern part of its development near Assiniboine Forest. 
There are existing developed properties along the route that 
have not yet tapped into that service; Qualico will be re-
imbursed when they do.* This kind of front-ending of services 
* Apparently, Laxdal residents successfully petitioned against installation 
of catchbasins in association with the Qualico drainage sewer. 
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could be a disincentive to development. There apparently is 
a lot of land where development is becoming more difficult 
and normally would not occur because of this front-ending 
situation. At the same time, developers are continuing to be 
active in consolidating Charleswood properties. As they 
acquire larger holdings, they may be more prepared to front-end 
service costs. 
It has been suggested in media reports of the current contro-
versy in Charleswood that the ditch drainage system is adequate 
during heavy rains and there is no need for a storm sewer 
system. However, the ditch drainage apparently is not sufficient 
during the spring melt. As a result, granular roads get satu-
rated and, in the freezing/melt processes, are subject to ex-
tensive damage. In addition, there apparently have been long-
standing safety concerns re children playing and walking in 
the granular road areas (due to the absence of sidewalks and 
the depth of some of the ditches). These concerns cannot be 
allayed with the current servicing situation in these areas. 
5.0 CHARLESWOOD LOCAL IMPROVEMENT PLANS 
- The issue of the maintenance of Charleswoodls granular 
roads was active through to 1983-84 as a result of a court 
case and subsequent appeals launched by the Charleswood 
Homeowners Association. During these years, both the road 
and drainage issues also were the subject of proposals/reports 
to the committee on works and operations and meetings of 
Charleswood property owners. Also in 1983, the provincial 
legislature passed certain amendments to the City of Winnipeg 
Act concerning the establishment of special assessment levy 
dTStricts in which a trunk storm water drainage system could 
be constructed and the costs levied on benefiting lands at a 
uniform district rate. 
- In August 1984, council approved a land drainage program for 
Charleswood consisting of the following components: 
·The trunk sewer system, estimated to cost $12.5 million 
for areas north and south of Ridgewood Avenue, was to be 
financed by a surcharge on developable or vacant lands 
(estimated to recover $7.98 million) and successful 
implementation of a by-law creating a special assessment 
levy district to raise the remaining $4.54 million (to be 
distributed as follows: $1.63 million from unserviced 
developed areas; $2.62 million from developable/vacant 
areas; and $.29 million from city property). The city 
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would be required to finance up to $7.98 million of 
this cost until all or a portion of the total could 
be recovered as development proceeded on the vacant 
lands. The surcharge (estimated at $1,500 per lot) 
was to be increased over time to offset the city's 
carrying charges and keep pace with rising construc-
tion costs. 
·Lateral sewers were to be constructed within existing 
developed areas through successful implementation of 
a by-law to undertake the works as a local improvement 
(estimated cost: $4.25 million based on the prevailing 
city-wide rate of $18 per frontage foot). The works 
were predicated on the trunk system proceeding; in 
addition, it was assumed portions of th~ ditch sy~tem 
would remain to convey water to catchbasins on the 
lateral or trunk systems. 
·The city at large was to be responsible for roadway 
oiling along the roads where drainage sewers were 
constructed in the year immediately following the 
sewer construction (estimated cost: $1.03 million over 
the five-year installation program). Thereafter, 
council's policy of requiring this work to be done as 
a local improvement was to be reinstituted for the 
affected lands. (26) 
- In March 1985, council rescinded this proposed program after 
legal officials raised questions about the city's ability to 
impose a special lot surcharge. An alternative financing 
proposal was sought to provide the trunk system at a cost to 
home owners similar to that proposed in August 1984. The 
new financing/development arrangement approved by council in-
cluded the following components: 
·The special assessment district would be formed, 
subject to successful implementation of the by-law, 
with all lots deemed to be benefiting from the trunk 
drainage system to be assessed an estimated uniform 
rate of 6.7 cents per square foot. Existing resi-
dential lots are considered benefiting to a depth 
of 150 feet. The city at large will be responsible 
for the front-end costs of the trunk system for 
depths beyond the 150-foot mark. Recovery would 
occur if and when these lots are subdivided at a rate 
of the then equivalent square-foot levy. The estimated 
cost of the work to be funded by the special district 
levy is $5.4 million. 
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·Another $5.3 million in drainage works are estimated 
to be the responsibility of developers who will now 
be expected to fund and construct storm water retention 
lakes and drainage conduits to serve their subdivisions 
in the special assessment district. They also will be 
expected to include additional capacity for adjacent 
unsubdivided lands or to pay the city a trunk service 
rate in lieu of a land drainage capacity installed by 
others. 
·Lateral sewers are to be proceeded with as local 
improvements, assessed at a rate of $18 per frontage 
foot. Lands benefiting are those fronting on existing 
sewers and watermains in the special assessment district. 
The estimated cost is $4.4 million. 
·The city at large is to fund the cost (an estimated 
$1.08 million) of restoring the oiled surface gravelled 
roadways on each street following installation of land 
drainage trunk and lateral sewers, subject to reinstate-
ment of council's policy on these works as local improve-
ments once the restoration is completed. (27) 
- It should be noted that a substantial portion of the special 
assessment district is located south of the Ridgewood corridor, 
an area which is subject to disagreement between the city and 
provincial urban affairs department as to the placement of the 
urban limit line in Plan Winnipeg. (See Map 1.) Thus, the 
proposed program outlined above is conditional on the resolution 
of this difference. 
- It should also be noted that the March 1985 program is to occur 
over a four-year period and that final costs could differ from 
those estimated above. In addition, the 1985 program in aggre-
gate is estimated to cost $1.6 million less than that proposed 
in 1984. 
- Lands previously assessed for trunk and/or lateral drainage 
sewers, or lands already so serviced and paid for under 
development agreements, are excluded from the above program. 
- Information presented to council in March indicated the 1985 
program would mean a marginal increase in costs for.the trunk 
sewer system for affected owners on presently subdivided lots. 
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- By proceeding with a special assessment district, within 
which the 6.7 cents per square foot levy will apply to 
benefiting developed and vacant lands, it is estimated the 
Charleswood owners will be paying about 40 per cent less 
than if the trunk and lateral sewer program were to pro-
ceed under the city•s uniform rates. The aggregate charge 
for trunk and lateral sewers under those rates would be 
$48 per frontage foot whereas the program for Charleswood 
apparently amounts to the equivalent of approximately $28 
per frontage foot. 
- Since this program was a city-initiated local improvement/ 
special assessment district, the process is subject to 
legislative provisions for an adverse petition from owners. 
The legislation is not precise about the form of such a 
petition. The city•s practice has been to provide a 
•formal petition• [if so requested] which lists the affected 
owners and facilitates subsequent confirmation of whether 
the petition is •sufficient•. Property owners, of course, 
may develop their own, informal petitions as well. Because 
of the magnitude of the Charleswood program, the city con-
cluded that petitions circulated by residents would not be 
a feasible option within the one-month time limit to raise 
an adverse petition. It opted for two mai 1 -in ba 11 ots --
one for the trunk sewer proposal requiring an adverse 
petition from owners of at least three-fifths of the total 
area to be assessed, and one for the lateral system, requir-
ing an adverse petition from owners of at least three-fifths 
of the frontage of lands to be assessed. 
- It should be noted that to expedite the advertising and 
appeal process in Charleswood, and to enable the city to 
levy assessments as work is completed, a number of amendments 
to the City of Winnipeg Act were proposed in March. However, 
they were not processed during the last session of the legis-
lature. (28) 
6.0 PROCESS ISSUES 
In general, the process under the City of Wihnipeg Act for an adverse 
petition against a local improvement seems cons1stent w1th the M~hitipal 
Act of Manitoba and Rogersr outline of the Ontario legislation 1n the early 
1970s. There are differences in the criteria for a •sufficient' petition 
but any changes here would require legislative amendment. There seems to 
be the additional hearing process in the Municipal Act at the first reading 
stage of the by-law. The provisions of the City of Winnipeg Act appear to 
be far more detailed and complex than those of the Munit1pal Act. 
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In short, the negative-response petitioning appears to be a common 
procedure in those instances where a local improvement is initiated by 
a council. Whether it is •undemocratic• is subject to differences of 
opinion as to how the state should be able to exercise its statutory 
powers and how the exercise of these powers is to be controlled. It 
may be argued that: 
- The city has the authority to initiate a local 
improvement and does not appear to be required 
to provide a rationale for this exercise of 
authority. 
- It may be inferred that the city has deemed the 
works to be necessary and that, to proceed in a 
comprehensive and planned way, council should take 
the initiative. (This touches on questions of 
equity and who is benefiting.) 
- By proceeding with the work as a local improvement, 
council has exercised its discretionary authority 
to determine that it is the affected property owners 
who will benefit from the proposed works. 
- It is •democratic• to permit owners to vote on the 
council •s intent since they will bear the costs of 
the improvements -- and, in fact, it provides a more 
direct form of democratic control than occurs with 
many other types of taxation.* 
- The use of negative responses or veto power is not 
alien to western democratic systems. 
- Differences of view may arise as to the strategic 
implications of requiring a •no• as opposed to a •yes' 
petition. Both approaches require mobilization of 
owners. Additional research would be required on 
voting behaviour and strategies to determine whether 
one type of approach has certain relative advantages 
over another and, if so, what biases might be intro-
duced. Another question is whether a referendum 
approach in which all eligible owners Lpetitioned~ or 
•voted• would be more appropriate. 
* The Ontario legislation provides for defined instances where a council 
may proceed with a local improvement on a two-thirds vote without 
reference to owners at a 11 but, in some cases, subject to muni cipa 1 
board approval. 
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- The departure from practice in the Charleswood case is 
the use of a mail-in ballot as a 'petition'. The number 
of owners involved, as well as the extent of the area, 
also were unique. These factors would seem to have 
strategic implications for mobilizing owners to react --
e.g., would it be easier to mobilize owners on a street-
by-street basis rather than area-wide? 
The Charleswood case also was complicated in that two 
ballots were required -- one for all owners affected by 
the special assessment district levy (i.e., owners of 
developed and undeveloped land) and one for those in developed 
areas to be assessed on a frontage basis for lateral storm 
sewers. However, two 'petitions' also would have been re-
quired had opponents gone door-to-door or in other ways 
sought signatures. Again, the issue may be a strategic 
one since local improvement legislation appears to place 
considerable onus on owners to be self-informed and to 
respond appropriately to the publication of official notices. 
In this case, Charleswood residents received an additional 
and individualized form of notification of council's intent. 
Moreover, the drainage issue is a long-standing one involving 
a relatively high profile (i.e., public meetings in 1983 and 
1984, a related court case, and council motions on the subject 
in August 1984 and March 1985). It may be useful to refer to 
Rogers' comments about the approach of the courts to these 
process-type issues (see page 3 above). 
- If there is a question about the 'democratic' nature of the 
process and criteria involved in this case, it may relate to 
the legislative criteria for 'sufficiency' since these relate 
only to the amount of assessable land which petitioning owners 
represent. If there are only a few owners holding large par-
cels, they would appear to have an advantage compared to a 
situation under the Municipal Act and Ontario legislation where 
the criteria include a specific number of owners, as well as a 
specific land area. This question would be relevant primarily 
to the petition on the trunk sewer system which would involve 
owners of undeveloped lands. 
- There may be an argument that the city should have engaged in 
two sequential processes -- proceeding first to test opinion 
on the trunk system. This, however, would have had certain 
disadvantages re communication of information, mobilization of 
owners and comprehensive planning/financing. 
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It may also be noted that the tendency in municipal legislation 
has been to remove ratepayer powers to vote directly on money or other 
matters and that there is a general disinclination in the Canadian 
political system, in contrast to the American as an example, to en-
courage direct democracy. In this context, local improvement provisions 
may be considered an anomaly -- one that presumably rests on the theory 
of benefits (and associated distribution of costs) applied to such im-
provements. 
7.0 EQUITY ISSUES 
These issues are very complicated and can be argued on many levels. 
What follows is a preliminary exploration only. On the basis of this 
preliminary review, it is suggested that the situation facing the Charles-
wood residents who oppose the proposed drainage system essentially is 
political which requires that: 
-they clearly define their objectives (e.g., do they not 
want any system, or do they wish to redistribute some 
costs to the city at large?) 
- they be able to muster sufficient community support 
and consensus in Charleswood 
-they be able to muster sufficient political support 
across the city to reverse or amend council Ls intended 
course of action 
- they be able to muster provincial support, at least 
insofar as the Ridgewood South issue (urban limit line) 
is concerned. 
This author is not able to comment on whether any technical grounds 
may exist for a court challenge, or whether the legal perceptions of 
'equity' are significantly different from other perceptions. 
In terms of local improvement legislation and policy, the key politi-
cal factor is the level of discretionary author1ty g1ven to municipalities 
to determine who benefits and how costs shall be distributed. This is 
especially evident in the Charleswood situation where council has initiated 
the local improvements, and where, given the scale of the situation, council 
can hardly be considered a neutral or disinterested party as to the outcome. 
It may be useful to pursue the legislation and/or precedents to which 
Rogers refers in his suggestion that there is a factor of scale beyond which 
improvements can no longer be considered 'local' improvements (refer to 
pp. 1-2 above). It may also be interesting to explore the history of local 
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improvement legislation to determine its underlying rationale and the 
appropriateness of this rationale to contemporary urban development. 
There are apparent inequities or inconsistencies in local improve-
ment legislation and policies in Winnipeg. For example, the emphasis 
on uniform rates would appear to be inequitable for those areas which are 
less expensive to service. The deferment policy (see page 8 above) 
contains a subsidy by the city at large, the trade-off being the admin-
istrative ease with which the policy could be implemented as opposed 
to some alternative to recover the foregone interest. It is the view 
of some that a requirement for original construction of a work to be 
done as local improvement, but the practice of renewal or reconstruction 
to be done by the city at large, is inconsistent, if not inequitable. 
More research would be required to determine whether the legislation 
and policies have been applied equitably by the city. The sewer relief pro-
gram (see pp. 9-10) and the extensive streetscaping under the Core Area 
Initiative, especially in areas of residential development, provide ex-
amples of the discretion which can be applied to what is considered a 
'local improvement'. In the case of the former, an argument can be made 
that the city at large benefits from the prevention of outflows of sewage 
into the rivers during heavy rains. At the same time, substantial private 
benefit accrues to those who escape future basement flooding (in addition 
to various compensation programs which may have been offered during the 
periods of extensive basement flooding which occurred in the past in the 
city). In this case, scale (both physical and political) probably was a 
determining factor in council's decision to have the costs borne entirely 
by the city at large. 
In terms of Charleswood's position vis-~-vis Winnipeg, the consensus 
seems to be that the area's servicing situation is unique. It also is 
cumulative in nature, reflecting historical and contemporary development 
patterns, and past decisions (or lack of decisions) by governments and 
ratepayers. 
- Until Unicity, land drainage planning and decision-making 
were subject to fragmentation. The potential for inequities 
arising out of this situation was recognized by the metro-
politan government and the Local Government Boundaries 
Commission (see pp. 4-5). For Charleswood, the semi-rural, 
non-contiguous nature of development, and the fragmentation 
of land ownership, were additional impediments to resolution 
of the problems. 
- Since the Metro era at least, Charleswood has been considered 
a key area for more dense forms of urban/suburban development. 
Metro planners acknowledged the impediments posed by the 
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drainage situation (see p. 11). However, Metro apparently 
lacked the authority to act direttly and, in its 1~70- plan 
for the area, appeared to rely on the study then underway 
under Charleswood's auspices to develop an appropriate solution. 
At the time of unification, it appears that no special con-
sideration was accorded to the Charleswood situation. While 
expectations may have been raised with the equalization of 
municipal mill rates and the province's emphasis on the 
quality of services, the 1970 proposals on reorganization seemed 
to assign considerable discretion to the new unified council 
in determining regional standards of services (see p. 6). 
Additional research would be required to assess whether the 
pattern of development which has been permitted since unifica-
tion has adversely and unfairly affected privately-owned 
property in Charleswood. If so, owners might be eligible for 
deferment of local improvement levies under the city's 1978 
policy (see p. 8). 
- Given long-standing policy to change the nature and direction 
of development in Charleswood, it would appear both government 
and ratepayers have squandered time which could have been used 
to ease the transition for the older developed areas lacking 
full services. Owners who have resisted local improvement 
initiatives are vulnerable to the suggestion that they are 
'free riders'; i.e., they are attempting to minimize their costs 
while capitalizing into the increased values of their properties 
the impact of development around them. Government is vulnerable 
to the suggestion that it has failed to acknowledge a broader 
or more general benefit accruing to the city as a whole as a 
result of the policy change concerning the character of devel-
opment in Charleswood. 
-It may be asked, as it was by Metro in 1966 (seep. 5), whether 
there is some general benefit to rationalization of the drainage 
systems in Charleswood and, therefore, greater equity in having 
the city at large bear something more than the costs of road 
restoration following construction of the proposed trunk and 
lateral sewers. Similarly, if development indeed is currently 
impeded by the drainage situation, is there a general benefit 
to the city to relieve that impediment; or, given the contro-
versy over the urban limit line, is it in the city"s interest 
not to encourage development in Charleswood (e.g., to scale down 
its proposed improvements)? 
- It may be argued that the city's policy on the maintenance and 
renewal of granular roads fails to acknowledge CharleswoodLs 
unique situation and the implications of the long-standing 
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policy to intensify the area's residential development. 
- It would appear the proposals for financing the trunk and 
lateral sewers have the effect of providing Charleswood 
with some relief relative to what the costs per frontage 
foot would be under the city's uniform rates for both types 
of work. Whether any inequity exists in this situation 
would depend on what the actual costs of providing these 
works are in Charleswood and what costs have been entailed 
under development agreements. 
In summary, it may be argued that both government and ratepayers have 
not followed through on the repercussions of the Metro policy designating 
Charleswood as an area of urban expansion. Enforcement of the policy 
appears to have been limited to development agreements and subdivision 
approvals adjacent to older areas of development. Moreover, government•s 
main response to the costs of raising the standard of services in the older 
areas has been to add to the types of services subject to local improvement 
levies. 
A compromise to the current situation might build on the cityls de-
ferment policy, in which the city at large would recognize some respon-
sibility for the situation that has developed in the older areas of 
Charleswood and thus provide some relief to owners in those areas. This 
relief should be subject to some form of recapture, however-- i.e., the 
city would receive some reimbursement upon subdivisi_on, rezoning~ zoning 
variances and/or sale of the subject properties. This assumes the i.mprove-
ments would be capitalized in the value of the property and recoverable 
in the marketplace, as is assumed under development, zoning and other 
similar agreements. Such an approach may require a more comprehensive 
plan for servicing the affected areas-- i.e., to involve other hard 
services besides drainage and road restoration. Such an approach should 
help overcome equity concerns that may arise between owners of the older 
properties and those in new subdivisions in Charleswood, and between 
owners and owner-developers. 
In terms of the situation between owners and owner-deyelopers~ council ~s 
August 1984 improvement proposal appeared to place the major portion of 
financial responsibility for the trunk drainage system on developable lands. 
The March 1985 proposal apparently does this as well although the aggregate 
figures were not presented to council in a form that makes the cost dis-
tribution readily identifiable. In this context, concerns that residents 
of the older areas of Charleswood are in some way subsidizing future de-
velopment appear to be incorrect. In addition, it appears as though the 
March 1985 proposal will place more responsibility on developers for front-
ending of certain drainage system costs than did the August 1984 proposal. 
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8.0 SUMMARY 
- In terms of process, the requirement for an adverse petition 
on a council-initiated local improvement is consistent with 
other relevant Manitoba and Ontario legislation. The departure 
in the Charleswood case was the use of the mail-in ballots or 
petitions which, in a strategic sense, may have had implications 
for mobilization of opposition but, in a formal sense, appears 
to have been an additional and individual form of notice beyond 
that required in legislation. On the surface, it does not 
appear the city could be accused of acting in bad faith or 
exceeding its jurisdiction. 
The equity issue is complicated and has only been explored in 
a preliminary way. An argument may be advanced that the city 
should exercise its discretion and absorb a greater proportional 
share of the costs of the proposed works, and/or build on its 
deferment policy to provide some relief to affected homeowners. 
This essentially would be a political decision and would be 
dependent on the intensity of support the Charleswood case 
could develop. It may also be dependent on whether this matter 
will bring the urban limit line issue to the forefront again. 
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